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Abstract
How do large social transfers affect labor supply? This study anal-
yses the South African pension program to answer this question. I
exploit a major demand shock - the South African recession that be-
gan in 2008 - in a regression discontinuity design to find prime aged
adult labor supply falls in response to pension arrival in the house-
hold only during the recession for sectors and types of workers affected
by the recession. Post-recession, these workers witness an increase in
demand and respond by increasing supply. Pension payments conse-
quently have small and statistically insignificant effects on labor sup-
ply, a result that contrasts starkly with all existing studies. I argue
these results stem from the combination of two forces. When labor
demand is weak, the opportunity cost of leisure falls and workers de-
mand more leisure. If a household member draws a pension, with
leisure being a normal good, leisure demand increases further.
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1 Introduction
How do social transfers affect labor supply? This paper examines the South
African pension program to answer this question. The South African pension
program is one of the largest transfer programs in existence, particularly for
a developing country. The size and scale of these transfers sets it apart from
social transfer programs in most developing countries [Case and Deaton,
1998]: in 2017, a third of the monthly household income in South Africa
came from the pension program, according to the National Income Dynamics
Survey. Social transfer programs as a way to reduce poverty in developing
countries are now under increased attention [Hanna and Olken, 2018]. Given
redistribution from one household member to another, a policy such as the
pension program can have unwanted impacts as transfers meant for the old
are distributed to younger household members.
I find pension payment leads to a reduction in labor supply but only
during the recession that began in 2008. Further, this fall is limited only
to workers and sectors affected by the recession. Labor supply is unaffected
by pension payments into the household in the years post-recession. All
these effects are for prime-aged adults co-resident with pensioners; pension-
ers themselves are excluded. Therefore, all changes in labor supply as a
result of the pension come from a reallocation of pension income. I argue
these responses come from two channels. When labor demand weakens, the
opportunity cost of leisure falls and so leisure demand rises. With leisure
being a normal good, the arrival of a pension income raises the demand for
leisure further. When these two effects operate together, labor supply falls
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dramatically; individually, neither effect exerts a strong influence.
As the sample is restricted to prime aged adults observed in all waves, the
impact of the pension therefore varies over time for the same set of workers.
That the pension has a time-varying impact is new as is the interpretation
that I propose. Importantly, pension payments can have negligible effects on
labor supply. Many studies find large impacts of this program on labor supply
in either direction and propose various mechanisms to explain their results
[Bertrand et al., 2003] [Ranchhod, 2006] [Ardington et al., 2009] [Ardington
et al., 2016] [Abel, 2019]. None of these explanations can rationalize a null
effect; my explanation can. The implication is that large social transfers may
not leak onto unwanted recipients.
Using the South African recession that began in 2008 as a shock to labor
demand helps uncover this mechanism: when the recession is active, weekly
hours worked is lower by a statistically significant 28 hours in pensioner
households compared to non-pensioner households. These effects disappear
when the recession fades.1 Confirming the demand-led hypothesis I find
strong supply reductions only in the sectors which were hit particularly hard
by the recession - mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and
financial services [Verick, 2012]. As most of these sectors are dominated by
men, I also find statistically significant and large reductions for men. The
supply reduction is concentrated amongst the medium-skilled: I argue below
these are the workers most likely to suffer during a recession. Post-recession,
workers are able to transition from low to medium skill jobs indicating a
1Given the standard deviation in hours worked is 17 hours during the recession period
and 14 in the period after, these estimates of the labor supply drop during the recession
are very large.
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strengthening of demand. Labor force participation also rises in parts of
the country where barriers to employment are quite large, offering further
evidence of strengthening demand.
To estimate the impact of pension arrival on labor supply, I use a re-
gression discontinuity design which arises from the design of the pension
program. Adults over the age of 60 are eligible to receive the pension (sub-
ject to a means test) but must apply for it. As the decision to receive the
pension is left to the pension eligible, pension inflow cannot be treated as
exogenously assigned to members of households with pensioners. I thus uti-
lize the age cut-off of 60 to estimate a regression discontinuity, comparing
working age adults residing with just eligible household members to working
age adults residing with household members just below the cut-off age of 60.2
The identifying assumption is that individuals on either side of the cut-off
are essentially the same, differing only in their exposure to “treatment” i.e.
having a pension earning older household member. Given treatment assign-
ment is exogenous as it derives from the age of an individual, treatment can
then be taken to be randomly assigned around the cut-off. Therefore the
change in hours worked at the cut-off can be attributed to the treatment.
The main distinguishing feature of this study is the use of long-run panel
data. I use information from five rounds of the National Income Dynamics
Survey (NIDS) which spans nine years from 2008 to 2017. It is meant to
be nationally representative, so we can understand the average impact of
the pension program across the country. NIDS follows people over time,
2An instrumental variables specification, using exogenous variation induced by the age
at which pension eligibility occurs, reveals hours drop by a statistically significant 12 hours
between 2008 and 2011-12 and a statistically insignificant small increase from 2013 onward.
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while gathering information on employment and pension receipt amongst
many other variables so we can see how labor supply responds to pension
receipt for the same individual over a nine year period. 3 To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first time such data have been used to examine the
labor supply response to the pension program. The advantage of long run
panel data lies in its ability to reveal how transfer impacts vary over time
for the same worker, which is obviously impossible with the short panels
[Ardington et al., 2009], [Abel, 2019] or cross-sections [Bertrand et al., 2003];
[Ranchhod, 2006] that have been used so far.4
These results are robust to controls for various confounding factors - age,
gender, education, race, household size; as well as different bandwidths used
to estimate the treatment effect. Household structure has been demonstrated
to change in response to the pension [Edmonds et al., 2005]; [Ardington et al.,
2009]; I am able to reject this as a confounding factor. I am also able to reject
alternate explanations of labor supply responses to pension receipt: that it
relaxes a childcare constraint [Ardington et al., 2009] or that it allows for
rural men to migrate for work [Ardington et al., 2016].
The decision to look at labor supply is motivated by certain features of
the South African economy. South Africa has high levels of unemployment,
which hasn’t changed much since Apartheid’s end nearly three decades ago.
As is well known, South Africa has striking racial disparity in income levels,
the nature of the labor market and the distribution of unemployment. In
3The first survey was held in 2008 and a new round is held every 2 years. In the first
wave, a little over 7,000 households comprising around 26,000 individuals were interviewed.
In subsequent waves, these numbers grow.
4[Ardington et al., 2016] use a long panel but it is restricted to one district which
implies we cannot generalize from their findings to the whole country.
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2017, white South Africans earned a little over 8 times what Black South
Africans earned, in terms of nominal per-capita household income. Black
South Africans were 5% less likely to be employed and 13% more likely to
be in informal occupations. Unusually for a developing country, the informal
sector is relatively small [Kingdon and Knight, 2004]: 3/4ths of jobs were
in the formal sector in 2017 - making a 13% difference large.5 Even when
Black South Africans are able to work, therefore, this is concentrated in a
small sector of the economy marked by greater uncertainty over period of
work, worker protection and benefits. Identifying the effect of large transfer
payments in such a scenario is crucial.
As an empirical matter, labor supply decisions are easily observed at the
individual level. Consequently, we can examine labor supply choices as a
function of changes in household resources in a transparent way. Other con-
sumption decisions are typically observed only at the household level, making
it difficult to understand within household redistribution. The next section
briefly describes the pension program and the recession that hit in 2008. I
then present some summary evidence of the impact of the pension. A regres-
sion discontinuity design - my main specification - then follows. I supplement
these estimates with additional tests and conclude with a discussion of these
results.
5The definition of formality I use is if the agreement to work was a written contract.
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2 The South African Old Age Pension: a brief
The pension program dates back from pre-Apartheid days, wherein it was
constructed as a way to support elderly Whites who retired from the labor
force. It is a means-tested payment, available at present to anyone over the
age of 60. In the past, the age of eligibility varied by gender: the cut-off age
was 60 for women and 65 for men. In the period from 2008 to 2010, the age
eligibility for men fell incrementally to 60 [Ralston et al., 2016]. The decision
to receive the pension is up to the pension eligible: the South African pension
program can thus be understood as a means-test system together with self-
selection, which [Hanna and Olken, 2018] claim yields superior screening.6
Pension amounts and the maximum level of income for eligible recipients
of the pension have adjusted upwards over time. In 1993, [Case and Deaton,
1998] report the maximum benefit was Rand 370 a month. The level of the
pension would start adjusting downward when the pre-pension sum of income
and the value of assets owned exceeded Rand 90 per month and would go to
zero if the sum exceeded Rand 370 a month. At present, the maximum level
of income is Rand 6510 per month and of assets owned is Rand 1,115,400
per month. These figures double for married individuals.7.
6The superior screening is evident in the small amount of leakage in this program: 2.7%
of those residing in households with no member eligible for the pension report receiving
a pension payment while 78% of those residing in households with at least one member
eligible for the pension report receiving a pension. The latter number is lower than 100%
either because some people don’t pass the means test, or the costs to getting the payment
are too high. The latter possibility doesn’t appear to be large. Costs to obtaining or
delivering the pension would be higher for rural areas but this does not appear to be a
major hurdle: from the 2017 NIDS survey, rural Africans - the poorest racial category
and most likely to be located far away from urban centers - report higher rates of pension
receipt than urban Africans (30% versus 13%).
7The source for these numbers is the website maintained by the South
African government on the old age pension: https://www.gov.za/services/
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The pension payment has increased over time in real terms as well. In
December 2016 prices, the median payment in 2008 was 1430 Rand which
changes to 1541 Rand in 2017. At the same time, pension take-up (calculated
as the fraction of those drawing pensions to those eligible to do so) decreases
from 90% in 2008 to 78% in 2017. Actual pensions received were quite close
to these stipulated amounts. In 2017, around 57% of the individuals receiving
a pension got Rand 1600 a month, while 32% got Rand 1500 per month: the
maximum pension amount was set at Rand 1600 per month, or Rand 1620
per month if older than 75 years during this time.8
South Africa went through a recession starting around the middle of 2008
and continuing until at least 2010 [South African Reserve Bank, 2009],[Ver-
ick, 2012]. In response to this, the South African government launched a
stimulus package with the aim of boosting demand and jobs: interest rate
reductions start in December 2008. Despite this the economy contracted
severely in 2009, and it wasn’t until the second quarter of 2010 that for-
mal sector employment rose after 6 successive quarters of contraction [South
African Reserve Bank, 2010]. Gross domestic product began to build in 2010
led mainly by an increase in public sector hiring; quarter-to-quarter employ-
ment by the second quarter of 2010 fell by 2.3% in the private sector [South
African Reserve Bank, 2010]. By 2012, gross domestic product grew by 3.5%
in the second quarter, and while this could not be sustained, there was no
consistent quarter-on-quarter contraction as witnessed during the 2008 re-
social-benefits-retirement-and-old-age/old-age-Pension
8The source for these numbers is the website maintained by the South African gov-
ernment on social security programs: https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/
ssptw/2016-2017/africa/south-africa.html
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cession [South African Reserve Bank, 2017].
Evidence on the drastic effects of the recession on the labor market can
be seen in the NIDS data. In terms of survey waves, the recession would
involve the first two waves: the first was held in 2008 and the second between
2010 and 2011. The next three waves from 2012 to 2017 would be the post
recession waves. Comparing sample means from these first two survey waves
to the next three waves , broad unemployment falls from 33% to 29%, rates
of discouragement fall from 11% to 4% and participation in the labor force
increases from 53% to 59% for adults aged between 17 and 59 years.9 Both
wages and household incomes rise in real terms, again comparing sample
means in the first two survey waves to the next three waves. Wages increase
from 3200 Rand to 4034 Rand, an increase of 25% while incomes rise from
7190 Rand to 8465 Rand, an increase of nearly 18%.10
3 Summary Evidence on the Impact of the
Pension
A program as generous as the pension is likely to involve significant changes
on many aspects of individual and household decision making. Table 1 shows
how labor supply, demographics and household structure change during and
post-recession, for pension and non-pension households. A household where
there is at least one member drawing a pension is termed a “pension house-
9Denote those not active in the labor force by n, unemployed who have stopped looking
for work by d, unemployed but looking for work by u and those employed by e. Labor
Force Participant = (u+ e)/(n+ d+ u+ e); Discouraged Worker = d/(d+ u+ e); Broad
Unemployment = (d+ u)/(d+ u+ e).
10All figures are in December 2016 prices.
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hold”. “Non-pension households” are those where there is no member draw-
ing a pension. For each of the two time periods, the sample average and
number of observations are shown. I also include the p-value of a two-tailed
test for differences in means between the pension and non-pension household
within each time period. The summaries in this table are restricted to adults
aged between 17 and 59 years old, so none of the results include data on
pensioners themselves.
Looking at labor supply decisions, we see there are large differences be-
tween pension and non-pension households irrespective of time period. Labor
force participation, hours worked and wages are lower for pension households
while rates of discouragement and unemployment are higher. Interestingly,
total household income - which includes pension income - is not significantly
different between pension and non-pension households during the recession
years. Reducing labor supply when pension payments flow into the house-
hold appears rational as it does not lower total income, assuming households
redistribute resources. Even when the difference becomes statistically signif-
icantly different in the post-recession years, total household income is only
around 5% lower in pension households. This stands in contrast to all other
labor supply variables, for whom the differences are quite large: the exception
to this is total hours worked, which we will examine in more detail.
Comparisons of these labor supply variables across time indicate an emer-
gence from recession. For each household type, labor force participation,
wages and household income rise over time. Rates of discouragement and
unemployment fall.11
11The narrow type of unemployment does not change much however over time.
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Demographic differences arise mostly along the dimensions of race and
urbanization. Black South Africans are more likely to draw pensions: re-
flecting the racial profile of the country most of the survey respondents are
black. Rural households are much more likely to have pension recipients.
This could be due to rates of job arrival and job quality which are both poor
in rural areas; also, rural households might have older household members.
Most of these demographic differences change little over the years, apart
from education increasing slightly which is perhaps simply due to the sample
population maturing.
Finally, we see evidence that households respond to the pension payment
by arranging themselves to take advantage of it. Pension households are
larger, typically with a larger share of older members and a lower share of
working age members. Such a pattern is consistent with younger members
choosing to live with older members (or vice versa), or choosing not to leave
older members when there is a pensioning member in the household. It
will be important to eliminate the influence of household structure when
examining the effect of pension transfers on labor supply decisions, as it
responds endogenously to pension receipt.
The results in this table are suggestive of very strong differences in labor
market outcomes between residents in pensioner households and residents in
non-pensioner households. It is not clear if these differences hold once we
control for potential confounders. Most importantly the decision to apply
for and receive the pension is endogenous to the pensioner, and thus the
pensioner household. In the following section, I show results using a regres-
sion discontinuity design: such a specification allows for a clean comparison
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between pensioner and non-pensioner households. Before that, however, I
sketch a brief theoretical explanation that sets up the main hypothesis.
4 Causes of the Labor Supply Shifts
A simple model of an optimal leisure-labor tradeoff can help understand
the effects of the pension on labor supply. A worker can be understood as
choosing between consumption and leisure: more hours spent working raises
income thus allowing for increased consumption but lowering leisure. This
tradeoff can be illustrated quite simply, and much of the following discussion
borrows from Varian [2014] in its setup.
Let p denote the price of consumption of a composite good, and C the
amount of the composite good. The amount of labor - measured in terms of
hours worked - is given by L, and the wage rate is w. With L¯ denoting the
maximum amount of labor possible, L¯−L = R will be the leisure consumed.
The maximum leisure consumed R¯ therefore equals L¯.
The budget constraint can be written as:
pC + wR = pC¯ + wL¯ (1)
The left hand side represents the total value of consumption plus the
“value” of leisure - obtained by multiplying the total amount of leisure time
by the wage rate, which is the opportunity cost of not working. The right
hand side represents the total value of the endowment of consumption and
the income from working, or the total of non-work and work income.
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The optimal mix of consumption and leisure is shown in Figure 1. Here,
consumption is on the vertical axis and leisure is on the horizontal. X repre-
sents the original consumption-leisure bundle, the point of tangency between
a given set of preferences shown by the indifference curve u0 and the budget
line indicated in the figure. The vertical intercept for this budget line equals
C¯ + w
p
R¯.
Pension arrival will increase non-work income, shifting the budget line
upward by the increase in non-work income, represented by C¯ ′ > C¯. As
the pension payment is lump-sum it does not alter the relative return for
working, meaning the upward shift will take place parallel to the original
budget line. For the given set of preferences, the new point of consumption
will be at Y , with an increase in the amount of consumption and an increase
in the amount of leisure. The entire effect of the pension on leisure operates
via an income effect, and if we assume leisure is a normal good (implict in
the construction of the indifference curves), then demand for leisure will rise.
In Figure 1, leisure demand rises from R0 to R1, which I denote by A.
The impact of a recession is outlined in Figure 2. The recession hit worker
sees a decline in the wage rate, from w to w′ with w′ < w, which reduces the
“price” of leisure. From the substitution effect we know this will increase the
amount of leisure demanded. This is not the only effect: there is the income
effect and specific to the case of labor supply, the endowment income effect.
Varian [2014] describes the derivation of these effects and shows the end result
of these three effects is ambiguous. In terms of the figure the fall in the wage
rate flattens the budget line which will pivot the budget line outward, and
because a fall in the wage rate means a fall in work income, the pivoted
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budget set will shift downward. It is unclear what the end effect on leisure
demand would be - I have drawn a case representing an increase meaning the
substitution effect dominates the income effect thus raising leisure demand
but it is straightforward to see how leisure demand may fall. The increase in
leisure demand equals B.
Pension arrival during a recession can have effects shown in Figure 3.
Here, the budget line pivots and shifts down due to the fall in the wage rate
(shown by the dotted line) and the pension shifts the budget line upward.
Again it is unclear apriori which effect will dominate to ultimately determine
leisure demand, however in comparison to just the recession case it is logical
to conclude leisure demand will increase by a greater amount. And if the
recession increases the demand for leisure, then again the increase in leisure
demand in this case will be greater than the increase just due to the pension
alone. For this case, the increase in leisure demand equals C.
In the way I have drawn the budget sets and indifference curves, leisure
demand increases in all three cases: A > 0, B > 0, C > 0 with C > A and
C > B. It is possible that B < 0, but C ≥ B must always be true. And if
leisure is a normal good, A > 0. As long as B ≥ 0, C ≥ A. That is, the
combination of pension arrival and a recession will have larger reductions in
labor supply than just a recession or pension arrival alone.
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5 Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the
Labor Supply Response
The regression discontinuity model I estimate can be written as:
Yiht = µ0 + τTiht +
p∑
j=1
µ−,j(Xiht − c)
j +
p∑
j=1
µ+,jTiht(Xiht − c)
j +Z′
iht
γ
(2)
Here i indexes individual, h indexes household and t indexes the survey
wave. Y is the outcome. X is the running variable, which is the age of the
oldest household member, from which we subtract c, the cut-off for deciding
pension eligibility which equals 60. T refers to the treatment indicator, i.e.
whether the household has a pensioner as a member or not. Finally, Z is a
vector capturing a variety of controls.
Equation 2 states the following: we run a weighted least squares regression
of the outome on a constant, the treatment indicator, a p-order polynomial on
the running variable and the covariates. The weights equal K((Xiht− c)/h),
where K() is a kernel function, and h the bandwidth. The parameter of
interest is τ which captures the change in the outcome at the cut-off. The
main identifying assumption is that individuals on either side of the cut-
off are essentially the same, differing only in their exposure to treatment.
Given the exogenous treatment assignment, treatment can then be taken to
be randomly assigned around the cut-off. Therefore the change in outcome
at the cut-off can be attributed to the treatment.
In order to estimate equation 2, I need to specify a choice of polynomial
order p, kernel function K and the bandwidth h. The choice of polynomial
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order is guided by recent work which suggests higher-order polynomials are
likely to be influenced by outlier observations [Gelman and Imbens, 2018].
Throughout I set p = 1, implying a linear fit. The choice of a kernel func-
tion in practice does not appear to heavily influence estimates, I adopt the
triangular kernel for K(), which puts greater weight on observations near
the cut-off. Bandwidth h is chosen to minimize the mean squared error of
the treatment effect and restricted to be symmetric on both sides of the
cutoff. Bandwidth choice can heavily influence estimates, so I undertake a
robustness check to various alternate choices of bandwidth.
As argued above, the pension has both incomplete take-up by eligible
individuals (to the right of the cut-off) and limited leakage to non-eligible
individuals (to the left of the cut-off). Compliance is therfore imperfect which
motivates estimating a fuzzy regression discontinuity model. A fuzzy model
splits the estimation into two stages. The first stages estimates the indicator
variable for pension take-up as a function of the running variable and the
eligibility for a pension, while the second estimates the outcome of interest
as a function of the same variables. The ratio between these two gives us our
parameter of interest τ [Cattaneo et al., 2018].
Hours worked is the outcome Y : in a regression discontinuity design, con-
tinuous variables are easily handled but categorical variables - such as labor
force participation or employment indicators - are harder to estimate. For
categorical outcomes, I instead estimate an instrumental variables specifica-
tion described below, which can handle both types of variables easily. To see
how robust our main parameter of interest τ is, I will also report the impact
on hours worked under both specifications - the regression discontinuity de-
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sign and the instrumental variables method. Using both specifications will
therefore tell us how workers respond on the extensive and intensive margin
to pension arrival.
All estimates come from a sample of adults aged between 17 and 59 years.
I am therefore eliminating the influence of pension receipt on pensioners: any
change in labor supply as a result of pension arrival is therefore due to a
reallocation of the pension income. I also impose the constraint that they be
present in all five waves of NIDS and in households that don’t attrite. These
choices are made to address attrition in the data. Attrition is an issue with
this survey, taking place systematically [Abel, 2019]. All results are therefore
subject to the caveat that they are coming off a sample that does not attrite.
Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design The age an individ-
ual declares is clearly central to the validity of this particular discontinuity
design. If this variable is manipulated, the main identifying assumption will
fail, as the cut-off cannot be treated as exogenously given. Comparing out-
comes at the thresholds of the cut-off cannot then be attributed to the treat-
ment alone. There is no reason, however, to suspect that survey respondents
would manipulate their age, as they derive no benefit from this.
To understand whether treatment assignment can be taken to be random,
I examine a simple frequency plot of the age of the individual. If there is
a discrete jump at the age of 60, we can infer some manipulation of the
age variable. As Appendix Figure A1 shows, however, there is a smooth
and continuous trend in the frequency of the age variable around the cut-
off value of 60. More formally, I test for statistical differences between the
17
probability of observing a 59 year old and a 60 year old and fail to reject the
null hypothesis of no differences: the p-value for the difference in means is
0.67.
In addition to the running variable, covariates should not change discon-
tinuously at the cut-off for the regression discontinuity design to be valid. If
they do, that would mean we are possibly conflating labor supply responses
with covariate responses. The first four columns of Appendix Table A1 show
the response of two measures of household composition to the pension: the
total number of young adults and working age adults. The total number of
young adults does rise (in the first two waves alone, again). This is both
a comforting and disconcerting result: comforting as other studies establish
household structure changing in response to the pension [Edmonds et al.,
2005] [Ardington et al., 2009] and disconcerting because disentangling house-
hold composition from pension arrival is now necessary. I will demonstrate
that houeshold composition changes do not explain all of the labor supply
responses in a later section. In the next four columns of Appendix Table A1,
I show that neither household size, age nor education levels change discon-
tinuously around the cut-off. Since race and gender are discrete variables, I
cannot test for a discontinuous jump in them, which is why they are absent.
Plotting Hours Worked versus Age To first assess whether a discon-
tinuity exists, I construct a regression discontinuity plot of hours worked by
an individual against the age of the oldest member of the household the in-
dividual resides in. We should see a sharp jump when the oldest household
member turns 60. Figure 4 shows this to be the case, with hours worked
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dropping when a household member becomes pension eligible. Importantly,
this only appears to occur for the first two waves.
In the left panel of Figure 4, I show a scatter plot of binned means of hours
worked by the age of the oldest household member for the first two waves,
together with a fitted regression specification drawn across the bandwidth
used to estimate the regression discontinuity. Hours at the cut-off age of 60
- when an individual becomes pension eligible - drop when a household gets
a pensionable resident. In the panel on the right, which is plotted for the
the next three waves, there is no drop. Instead, hours worked appear to rise
slightly at the cut-off, while the fitted regression lines imply a much more
modest effect.
Estimates of the Pension’s effect on Labor Supply The first two
columns of table 2 show treatment effect estimates of the pension, following
the method laid out in equation 2. I include the following individual level
controls: gender, race, education, a quadratic in age and household size. For
most of the paper, all regression results come off a sample of working age
adults aged between 17 and 59 who are present in all four NIDS waves and
reside in households that are not lost through attrition.
Labor supply falls by a statistically significant 28 hours, but only in the
first two waves. To understand the size of this estimate, the sample mean
and standard deviation of hours worked in primary jobs are 38 and 16.5
respectively. In the following three, the effect is much smaller and statistically
insignificant. Since I am restricting the sample to be the same set of workers,
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this response cannot be held accountable to changing types of workers.12
Appendix Table A2 reports first stage estimates for these specifications,
confirming that pension receipt is strongly correlated with age. Appendix
Table A3 shows results with two additional outcomes: hours worked in all
jobs for the salaried alone and hours worked in primary jobs for the salaried.13
The robustness of these estimates to bandwidth choice are shown in Ap-
pendix Table A4. To examine the role of the cut-off, I have also estimated
placebo tests by changing the cut-off to 59: the estimates are statistically
insignificant. These results are not shown but are available on request. 14
To ascertain how robust the main estimate is, I present the results of a
fixed effects instrumental variables model, which addresses endogenous pen-
sion take-up by instrumenting for household pension status. The instruments
I use are similar to those used by Abel [2019], Duflo [2003] or Case and Deaton
[1998] - the presence of pension eligible household members, determined by
their age. Specifically, I use the total number of male and female pension
eligible household members as instruments for whether a household has a
12Restricting further the sample to be balanced does not alter the results much: while the
sample size diminishes considerably the estimate for the first two waves is a statistically
significant reduction of 20 hours while that for the next three waves is a statistically
insignificant 8 hour rise. These results are not shown but are available on request.
13Those who are self employed have no hours worked entered under the primary job
heading, therefore all these outcomes are outcomes for the salaried.
14I have assessed the robustness of the main results to including household level controls
- estimates change very little when household level controls are incorporated. As household
composition appears to change across the cut-off, I have also tried including measures of
household composition - the total number of children (ages 0 to 5), young adults (ages 6
to 17), working age adults (ages 18 to 50) and older adults (ages 51 to 59) as covariates.
Results do not change much: τ for the first two waves is a statistically significant 25 hour
decrease while for the next three is a statistically insignificant 3 hour decrease - suggesting
that household composition changes cannot be the only factor causing supply to fall. These
results are not shown but are available on request.
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pensioner. That is, I estimate the following specification:
Yiht = β1 ∗ Pension Householdiht +Z
′
iht
γ + λi + ǫiht (3)
Pension Householdiht = α1 ∗ Total Pension Eligible Malesht
+α2 ∗ Total Pension Eligible Femalesht
+Z′
iht
γ + λi + νiht
(4)
Here, Yiht denotes the labor supply decision of individual i in household
h during survey wave t. Pension Household is an indicator variable that
equals one if i is in a household where a member claims a pension. As
before, Z is a vector of controls. Since these are panel data, I employ an
individual fixed effects specification, given by λi, thus using variation within
individuals who witness a change in household pension status between survey
waves. This allows for a differencing out of any time invariant unobservable,
such as ability, that could possibly confound the estimate of β1. Standard
errors are clustered by a grouped household identifier. 15
The identifiying assumption here is that pension eligibility (dictated by
age which is assigned exogenously) determines the presence of a pensioner,
and affects labor supply decisions of working age individuals only through
the household pension status conditional on controls Z. Household pensioner
status is determined by the presence of pension eligible individuals, so we
15As individuals can change households across time, their errors are likely to be corre-
lated within each household over time. For this reason, it is also not possible to cluster by
any one household identifier since individuals can change households over time. I define,
therefore, a grouped household identifier for the string of households generated by each
individual’s choice of residence in each wave.
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expect α1 and α2 to be positive.
16
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show estimates from the instrumental vari-
ables specification. Hours worked reduces by a statistically significant 12
hours during the first two waves which vanishes in the next three. First
stage results are shown further down. The instruments are strongly corre-
lated with the endogenous household pension variable, which we can tell by
the F-statistic and the individual coefficients. Further, the overidentification
tests indicate we can reject the instruments being correlared with the second
stage error terms.17
The main advantage of such a specification is that we can see how re-
sponses over the extensive margin - the probability of being employed - is
affected. These are shown in Panels A and B of Appendix Table A5. The
labor supply response on this margin is statistically insignificantly related to
pension arrival while the instruments appear both valid and relevant.
6 Mechanism of the Labor Supply Response
In this section I try to draw out the mechanism underlying the response of
labor supply to pension payments. Household composition changes endoge-
16I distinguish between gender of pensioners: previous work suggests redistribution of
pension resources takes place when a female pensioner receives payment [Duflo, 2003],
[Posel et al., 2006], [Ardington et al., 2009]. Whether the presence of pension eligible
members affects supply decisions only through the household’s pension status is perhaps
debatable. Pension arrival can shift bargaining powers of elderly women [Ambler, 2016];
we also know that household composition can switch in response to the pension. In either
case, measures of household composition can also be affected by pension eligibility, and
affect labor supply, making it imperative to include as a control.
17Columns 3 and 4 leave out total household members aged between 50 and 59; including
them has little effect on the results. I have not reported these results but they are available
on request.
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nously in response to the pension, so I present estimates of tests designed
to eliminate household composition as a possible explanation of the labor
supply response. I then consider why the response weakens over time. The
main hypothesis is that labor supply reduces when labor markets are tight,
that is, during the recession. Workers have difficulty in finding a job and if
there is a pension resource to draw upon, work part-time jobs relying on the
pension income to make up the short fall in total income. Once the recession
is past, and finding jobs is easier, they switch back to full time work and do
not need the pension income support. I undertake multiple tests designed to
isolate this mechanism.
Endogenous Household Composition Panel A of Table 3 shows esti-
mates constructed from sub-samples selected to filter out endogenous house-
hold composition as a confounding factor. By focusing on working age indi-
viduals who have parents of pensionable age that reside in other households,
I am able to explore whether transfers affect labor supply decisions across
households - not just within, which has been the focus so far. Household
composition changes now cannot be traced to a pensioning member of the
household. By construction, therefore, endogenous household composition is
eliminated as a confounding factor.18
Based on the results in Panel A, we can rule out household composition
as being the sole mechanism through which labor supply adjusts to pension
arrival. Whether there are any pension eligible parents, or pension eligible
mothers, labor supply falls in the first two waves. The presence of a pension
18In this test, since I do not know whether the non-resident parent takes up a pension
or not, I estimate a sharp regression discontinuity design.
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eligible mother has stronger effects, re-iterating earlier work which finds in-
come from female pensioners having strong effects [Duflo, 2003], [Posel et al.,
2006], [Ardington et al., 2009]. All of these effects shrink to statistical in-
significance in the next three waves.19 From these results, we can conclude
endogenous household composition cannot explain all the labor supply re-
sponse.
Recession To examine whether the recession induces the reduction in labor
supply, I exploit heterogeneity in the labor market over three dimensions: sec-
tor, gender and skill. First, following Verick [2012], I construct an indicator
variable for sectors that are affected by the recession: mining, manufacturing,
wholesale and retail trade, and financial, real estate and business services. If
slackening demand for labor causes workers to work part-time jobs relying on
the pension income to make up for the shortfall in total household income,
then the labor supply response we observe should be strong for sectors af-
fected by the recession. That is, if demand side factors cause supply to fall,
then we should observe this fall only in sectors where plausibly labor demand
fell.
19The outcome variable for the results in columns 3 and 4 of Panel C in Table 3 is weekly
hours worked in all jobs: the difference between this outcome and the one I use for much
of the paper - hours worked in primary jobs - is that the self employed are included in the
former outcome. Gender of the non-resident parent matters more, therefore, for the self-
employed and the self-employed are more likely targets for redistribution. Labor supply
reductions are weaker for hours worked in primary jobs when there is any non-resident
eligible parent than for hours worked in all jobs when there is a female non-resident eligible
mother. There is a statistically insignificant effect on hours worked in all jobs when there
is any non-resident eligible parent and for hours worked in primary jobs when there is
a non-resident eligible mother. Importantly, the overall pattern of a muted response in
waves 3 to 5 and a stronger response in waves 1 and 2 remains irrespective of outcome or
parent gender. A full description of results including those for hours worked in primary
jobs is given in Panel A of Appendix Table A6.
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Panel B of Table 3 shows that indeed this is what happens: the re-
duction in hours worked is large and statistically significant during the re-
cession years for workers in sectors hit by the recession. For workers in
non-recession sectors, we cannot reject a null effect at conventional levels of
significance.20 Post-recession, workers in neither sectors show a statistically
significant change in labor supply following pension receipt. 21
Second, since these sectors are male-dominated we would also expect to
see larger supply reductions for male workers compared to female workers.
22 Panel C of Table 3 shows results when restricting the sample to either
gender. We see results confirming our expectations: male workers see a large,
statistically significant fall during the recession years while for female workers
we cannot rule out a null effect.23
Third, I consider skill levels of workers. Returns to skill are convex in
South Africa: in the fifth survey wave in 2017, wages in high skill jobs were
higher by 145% relative to medium skilled jobs. In turn, wages for medium
skilled jobs were higher than wages in low skilled jobs by 128%.24
20The error is higher for non-recession sector workers despite a larger sample being used
to construct the estimate, so it isn’t being artifically generated by sample size following
the sample selection criterion.
21It is possible that some workers choose to leave these sectors in between survey waves
during the recession years so that some of the response in the non-recession hit sectors
could be coming off such workers. Ideally we would want to focus on workers who do not
change sectors or simply look at one survey period: either of these restrictions thins the
sample too much to have meaningful estimates.
22Workers are 10% more likely to be male in the recession hit sectors for the overall
sample.
23Again, the sample sizes are comparable between these workers so the larger error
cannot be completely driven by the sample size induced by the sample selection condition.
24Skill definitions come from Girdwood and Leibbrandt [2009].“Low Skill” includes mil-
itary and elementary occupations. “Medium Skill” includes clerks; service workers, shop,
market sales workers; skilled agricultural and fishery workers; craft and related trades
workers; and plant, machinery operators and assemblers. “High Skill” includes legislators,
senior officials, managers; professionals; technicians and associate professionals. Girdwood
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High skill workers are unlikely to suffer drastic reductions in demand
during a recession. Medium skilled are more likely to suffer given the nature
of the recession in terms of what sectors were affected; low skilled workers
would be - at least, relatively - equally likely to be in a recession hit sector
or not. For the overall sample, 65% of workers in recession affected sectors
were medium skilled while only 34% of workers in non-affected sectors were
medium skilled. Similar cross-sectoral differences are smaller for the other
two skill levels. Results from splitting the sample by skill are in Panel D of
Table 3.
The medium skilled see a large and statistically significant reduction in
supply. The estimate for the low skilled is lower and statistically insignif-
icant, while that for the high skilled is implausibly large and statistically
insignificant.25
Thus far I have presented evidence consistent with the fall in labor supply
as a consequence of pension arrival arising from recession induced demand
shocks. Workers affected by the demand shock cut their supply - that is,
working part-time jobs - if they have a pension income to rely on. From
Table 1, we know for these workers that their household income falls only
by a small amount. For workers who cannot draw upon a pension income
in their household, and work increased hours as a result, the return cannot
therefore be much higher per-hour of work than those workers who are able
to rely on a pension transfer. If they could rely on a pension, workers who
and Leibbrandt [2009] define 4 skill levels with technicians and associate professionals given
a level in between medium and high. I have included these workers as high skill workers
as otherwise the sample would be too thin to run a regression discontinuity for just them.
25These latter estimates possibly reflect a smaller sample size.
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faced a tight demand market chose part-time work, presumably as these jobs
are less desirable but easy to find. If jobs were desired, workers would not
wish to only contribute part-time.26
One implication of this demand-led hypothesis is that workers, particu-
larly in recession hit sectors, ought to see a rise in skill level over time. Recall
we are observing workers initially in the throes of a recession that I contend
are later able to transition into better jobs. Increases in skill are correlated
strongly with wage increases, and would be broadly consistent with the idea
of workers choosing more desirable jobs.
The results from testing this implication are shown in Column 1 of Panel
D in Table 3. The outcome here is defined as equal to 1 if the job is of
medium skill and 0 if of low skill. To test for how skill levels change over
time, I define a wave indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation is
in the fourth or fifth survey wave and 0 if in the first three. I use a fixed
effect logit model to estimate the relationship between this outcome and an
interaction term which consists of the indicator for the recession hit sectors
and the wave indicator variable. The sign on the interaction term reveals
that skill levels increase over time for those in the recession hit sectors.27
In the other columns in Panel D, I also report how responses over the
extensive margin vary over time for “Bantustans”. These are provinces which
26One way to interpret “less desirable” is in terms of wages earned. Using the regres-
sion discontinuity and instrumental variable estimates to bound the true impact of hours
worked, I define an indicator variable that equals 1 if hours worked is between 12 and 28
hours and 0 otherwise. Regressing wages on this variable with a host of controls reveals
up to a 1400 reduction in wages - equal to 1
4
of a standard deviation decline. Appendix
Table A7 has more detail on this result.
27The results reported are not marginal effects, so we cannot interpret the coefficient
term as a marginal effect. Since this is a non-linear model, marginal effects are not possible
to construct for interaction terms.
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are historical homelands i.e. reservations created under Apartheid: Eastern
Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, North West, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo. Job search
costs here are very high and thus the chances of finding a job are low, due
in large part to high transport costs. Therefore, I would not expect to find
much change over the intensive margin. Regression discontinuity estimates
for Bantustants are indeed statistically insignificant. I do not report them,
but these results are available on request.
We can see a large, and statistically significant, increase in labor force
participation over time for those living in Bantustans, indicating the end of
the recession and the revival of the labor market. While the other outcomes
do not suggest similar changes, they are all statistically insignificant. Taken
together, these results imply labor demand picks up over time even for those
in areas where employment prospects are poor.
Other Mechanisms The results so far suggest pensions affect labor supply
through labor demand. Other studies have pointed out alternate ways in
which pensions can affect labor supply. [Ardington et al., 2009] have argued
the pension relaxes a child care constraint, allowing working age individuals
- particularly mothers - to migrate for work. Further work [Ardington et al.,
2016] argues the pension helps fund labor migration for young rural men,
particularly those with a matriculate degreee. I test for the influence of
these channels in Appendix Table A8 but fail to find they are operational in
explaining labor supply decisions. The effects are statistically insignificant
when I consider mothers alone (Panel A of Appendix Table A8) or rural men
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alone (Panel B of Appendix Table A8).28 While it would be preferable to
further split the sample for rural men by educational status, this delivers
very small sample sizes. [Abel, 2019] too considers this mechanism and finds
it fails to explain labor supply decisions.
Related aspects A related aspect of these labor supply responses is whether
it takes place across generations, within them or both. I re-estimate the main
specification separately for the younger generation - defined to be those aged
between 17 and 35 years - and the older generation, defined to be those be-
tween 36 and 59 years of age. The younger generation reduces labor supply
by a larger amount than the older generation, again only during the first
two waves. These results suggest that pension payments amount to an in-
tergenerational transfer when they are redistributed within the household.
Appendix Table A9 has these results.
Earlier work [Duflo, 2003], [Posel et al., 2006], [Ardington et al., 2009]
suggests pension incomes are more likely to be allocated to other household
members when a female pensioner receives payment. To see if a similar effect
operates for labor supply, I restrict the sample such that there is no female
pensioner in the household and compare it to the sub-sample where there is
at least one female pensioner in the household. Statistically significant re-
ductions are only observed for households with at least one female pensioner,
again for only the first two waves. Appendix Table A10 has these results.
Ambler [2016] argues such gender based differences come from a change in
28Indeed the effect for hours worked by rural men in primary jobs goes in the opposite
direction to what we would expect if the pension funds labor migration. The estimated
confidence intervals are however too wide to be meaningful although they are bounded
away from zero.
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relative bargaining powers within the household.
Abel [2019] notes that the effect of pensions is unclear for unemployed
prime-aged adults. Pension resources can alleviate credit constraints thus
increasing search but can also lead to an increase in reservation wages. I
fail to reject a null effect of the pension on reservation wages (Appendix Ta-
ble A1129). Under the mechanism I have described, pension resources affect
labor supply only through a demand channel: if demand is weak, increas-
ing search is less likely to yield any profitable result. Given the null effect
on reservation wages, the mechanism I propose yields the following implica-
tion: the effect of the pension on unemployed prime-aged adults finding a
job should become more positive over time. As the recession weakens, the
benefits to increased search will rise, making employment more likely. I test
for this indirect implication of the main hypothesis and find it holds: the
probability of finding employment if previously unemployed is negative in
the first two waves but becomes positive by the last wave. The effect of the
pension is statistically insignificant in all these specifications; however, the
confidence intervals do move rightwards (Appendix Table A12).
Blattman et al. [2014] suggests credit constraints matter, so when given
cash transfers new businesses can start up. This implies labor supply should
respond positively to pension inflow for the self-employed. Examining the
impact of pensions solely for the self-employed reveals a statistically insignif-
icant effect, whether examining those co-resident with or resident in house-
29Here I report two outcomes - reservation wages and fair wages. Reservation wages are
responses by survey respondents to the question “What is the absolute lowest take-home
wage that you would accept for any permanent, full-time work (per-month)?”. Fair wages
are responses to the question “What do you think would be a fair take-home monthly
wage for you, given your age, education and skills?”
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holds separate from the pensioners (Appendix Table A13).Therefore the low
rate of enterpreneurship in South Africa cannot be due to credit constraints.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I demonstrate pensions affect labor supply on the intensive
margin through the demand side. Hours worked reduces by nearly 1.7 stan-
dard deviations in response to pensions - but only around the time when the
national economy is in a recession, and only for workers in sectors affected
by the recession. Pension arrival will increase the demand for leisure if it
is a normal good as pension income raises household income. A recession
lowers the opportunity cost of leisure, also increasing demand. Importantly,
neither the pension nor the recession by themselves lower labor supply - it is
the combination of the two events that appears to cause a reduction.
There at least two implications of these results. First, labor supply is
unlikely to reduce in response to pension payments when demand is healthy.
The implication is large unconditional cash transfers may not always have
distortionary effects. Identifying when these distortions are likely to arise can
be a way to ensure that a cash transfer program is effectively implemented.
Second, attention should be directly brought onto the labor market, if the
concern is around how the pension program affects its unintended recipients.
It isn’t clear, for instance, why the rate of self-employment is so low in South
Africa. Identifying the constraints to self employment can be useful as low
self-employment could be drawing down labor mobility. High labor mobility
can act as a buffer to episodes of tightness in labor markets.
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It is unclear however whether the labor supply reduction - when it does
take place - induced by the pension program is welfare reducing or welfare
improving. Ultimately these payments are transfers from South Africa’s rich
to their poor. All transfers have to be funded by taxation, which inevitably
entails a deadweight loss. A full calculation of these effects remain to be
carried out and is beyond the scope of the paper. To the extent that labor
supply is unaffected by the pension program, however, the deadweight loss
would be minimal.
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Figures
Figure 1: Pension Arrival Alone
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Figure 2: Recession Alone
Figure 3: Pension Arrival × Recession
35
Figure 4: This figure shows the drop in hours worked - shown by the grey dots - once a household member reaches
the pensionable age of 60, indicated by the vertical black line. The drop, however, occurs only in the first two waves.
In the next three waves, no drop occurs; indeed, the hours worked nudge upward slightly. The figures also include
a fitted regression line drawn across the bandwidth; the jump in these lines across the cut-off is used to derive the
regression discontinuity estimate. Controls used to estimate the regression are gender, race, urbanization, household
size, age and education. As indicated, a linear polynomial is used on both sides of the cut-off; and the bandwidth
is chosen to minimize mean squared error. (Source: National Income Dynamics Survey Waves 1 to 5)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Labor Supply, Demographics and Household Structure
Waves 1 and 2: 2008 - 2011 Waves 3 to 5: 2012 - 2017
Non Pension Pension Non Pension Pension
Household # Obs Household # Obs p Household # Obs Household # Obs p
Panel A: Labor Supply
Labor Force Participant∗ .552 13,217 .424 4,310 0 .621 24,938 .477 8,189 0
Discouraged Worker∗ .106 8,164 .157 2,165 0 .038 16,097 .07 4,202 0
Broad Unemployment∗ .317 8,164 .467 2,165 0 .263 16,097 .42 4,202 0
Narrow Unemployment∗ .236 7,300 .369 1,826 0 .234 15,480 .376 3,909 0
Hours Worked † 38.4 3,850 37.6 679 .246 42 8,356 40.9 1,537 .003
Wages ‡ 3,769 6,327 2,031 1,676 0 4,552 11,792 2,655 2,818 0
Household Income ‡ 6,832 13,821 6,707 4,542 .534 8,175 23,044 7,719 7,247 .009
Panel B: Demographics
Black .811 15,148 .852 5,044 0 .832 25,394 .846 8,414 .004
Male .425 15,148 .419 5,044 .448 .443 25,394 .442 8,413 .847
Urban .508 15,107 .348 5,042 0 .534 25,394 .363 8,414 0
Years of Education 8.73 15,087 8.63 5,027 .102 9.6 25,313 9.36 8,383 0
Panel C: Household
Structure
Household Size 5.21 15,148 7.28 5,044 0 4.83 25,390 7.26 8,414 0
Fraction 0-5 years .12 15,148 .119 5,044 .646 .109 25,390 .118 8,414 0
Fraction 6-17 years .242 15,148 .242 5,044 .766 .218 25,390 .234 8,414 0
Fraction 18-50 years .532 15,148 .396 5,044 0 .566 25,390 .399 8,414 0
Fraction 51+ .106 15,148 .243 5,044 0 .107 25,390 .248 8,414 0
Sample consists of working age adults (17 to 59 years old), who are present in all survey rounds, and reside in households that do not attrite.
∗: Denote those not active in the labor force by n, unemployed who have stopped looking for work by d, unemployed but looking for work by u and
those employed by e. Labor Force Participant = (u+e)/(n+d+u+e); Discouraged Worker = d/(d+u+e); Broad Unemployment = (d+u)/(d+u+e)
and Narrow Unemployment = u/(u+ e).
†: Hours worked in the primary job are reported; ‡: Wages and household income are in real terms, with December 2016 as the base year.
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Table 2: Labor Supply and Pension Arrival
Outcome: Hours Worked in a Week at the Primary Job
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Technique Regression Discontinuity Instrumental Variables
Waves 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Parameter
Discontinuity Estimate (τ)† -28.42 2.40
(8.89) (3.62)
Household Pension Indicator -12.57 -0.35
(4.51) (1.63)
Outcome Mean 38.26 41.84 38.26 41.84
Outcome Standard Deviation 16.51 13.69 16.51 13.69
Controls Ya Ya Yb Yb
Observations 4,502 9,868 2,178 7,021
Effective Observations:
Left of Cut-off 1556 1936 - -
Right of Cut-off 512 874 - -
First Stage Estimates
Total Pension - - 0.080 0.435
Eligible Males (0.06) (0.040)
Total Pension - - 0.658 0.615
Eligible Females (0.07) (0.033)
First Stage F-Statistic 47.00 307.90
Overidentification
Test Statistic 0.10 3.32
p-value Overidentification 0.76 0.07
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered by household for the regression discontinuity estimate and by a
grouped household identifier for the instrumental variables estimate. See the text for details.
† Point estimates and standard errors incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment
effect. For details of the regression discontinuity design, refer to the text.
(a) Controls include gender and race of the individual; urbanization status of the household the
individual resides in; years of education for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual
and household size.
(b) Controls include an individual fixed effect; household size; age and square of age; total household
residents aged 0 to 5, 6 to 17, and 18 to 50; years of education and square of years of education; an
indicator for urbanization status; household head’s age and square of age; household head’s years of
education; and an indicator for whether the household head is female.
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Table 3: Interpreting the Impact of the Pension Program on Labor Supply
Panel A: Household Composition Eliminated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Only Non-Resident Only Female Non-Resident
Sample Pension Eligible Pension Eligiblea
Period 2008-2011 2012-2017 2008-2011 2012-2017
Discontinuity -8.65 0.32 -25.67 -3.81
Estimate (2.96) (1.26) (8.43) (3.36)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,502 9,868 904 2,430
Panel B: Sectors Hit by Recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Recession Sector Non-Recession Sector
Period 2008-2011 2012-2017 2008-2011 2012-2017
Discontinuity -20.80 -3.697 -39.17 8.388
Estimate (9.76) (5.79) (24.68) (7.28)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,645 3,826 2,671 5,868
Panel C: Gender of Recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Male Female
Period 2008-2011 2012-2017 2008-2011 2012-2017
Discontinuity -32.87 -1.449 -39.06 6.478
Estimate (13.46) (6.61) (21.43) (6.196)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,188 4,774 2,314 5,094
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Interpreting the Impact of the Pension Program on Labor Supply: Table 3 Continued
Panel C: Skill Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Waves 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Discontinuity Estimate -17.49 7.055 -27.62 1.616 -191.4 4.706
(27.28) (6.93) (12.47) (5.64) (114.7) (12.74)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,461 3,356 2,076 4,310 824 1,859
Panel D: Demand Side Estimates:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Upward Skill Narrow Broad
Outcome Mobility Employed Employed Discouraged Participation
Wave 4 × 0.339
Recession Sector (0.169)
Wave 4 × -0.094 -0.038 0.244 0.193
Bantustan (0.088) (0.082) (0.174) (0.058)
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,045 10,211 12,492 4,553 28,886
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Individuals 988 3152 3724 1399 7094
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by household. Discontinuity estimates and standard errors incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment effect.
(a): Outcomes for all discontinuity estimates is hours worked in the reported primary job, however for the results in columns (3) and
(4) in Panel B the outcome is hours worked in all jobs. Self-employed individuals are included in the latter outcome.
Controls for Panels A through C are the same as in columns 1 and 2 in Table 2. (b): Controls in Panel D are the same as in columns
3 and 4 in Table 2.
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Figure A1: This figure shows the assignment to belonging to a pensioner
household, as a function of the age of the individual. Each bar plots the
total count of individuals of a particular age. The bars in dark grey show
the counts for individuals below the (pension eligible) age of 60, and those
in light grey show the counts for individuals above the age of 60. The lack
of discontinuity at the pension eligible age of 60 indicates that the assign-
ment to pension household is not being systematically manipulated. (Source:
National Income Dynamics Survey Waves 1 to 5)
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Table A1: Examining Changes in Covariates
Household Composition
Young Adults, Working Age Adults,
Ages 6 to 16 Ages 17 to 59 Household Size Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Waves: 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Point Estimate† 0.70 -0.20 -0.39 -0.25 0.11 0.18 -0.19 -0.40
Standard Error† 0.34 0.17 0.70 0.22 1.49 0.60 0.75 0.38
Lower 95% CI† 0.03 -0.54 -1.77 -0.68 -2.80 -0.99 -1.65 -1.14
Upper 95% CI† 1.36 0.14 0.99 0.18 3.03 1.36 1.28 0.34
Outcome Mean 1.58 1.45 2.61 2.52 5.73 5.44 8.70 9.54
Outcome Standard
Deviation 1.51 1.55 1.56 1.62 3.26 3.44 3.76 3.44
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 20,071 33,692 20,071 33,692 20,071 33,692 20,071 33,692
Effective Observations:
Left of cut-off 5193 7559 2229 4773 5193 6667 4635 5700
Right of cut-off 2712 4434 1464 3262 2712 4063 2490 3676
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression discontinuity design
with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first stage. Standard errors are clustered by the household the
individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is used to construct the estimates in the neighborhood of
the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean squared error of the treatment effect. The same bandwidth is chosen
on both sides of the cut-off. Controls for columns (1) to (4) include gender and race of the individual; urbanization status of the
household the individual resides in; years of education for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual and household size.
In columns (5) and (6) household size is dropped as a control. Education is dropped as a control for columns (7) and (8).
† Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment
effect.
42
Table A2: First Stage Estimates: Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
Second Stage Outcome Hours Worked in a Week Hours Worked in a Week Hours Worked in a Week
(Primary Job) (All Jobs, Salaried Only) (Primary Job, Salaried Only)
First Stage Outcome Household has Pensioner Household has Pensioner Household has Pensioner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Waves: 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Point Estimate† 0.35 0.27 0.42 0.36 0.24 0.41 0.36 0.27 0.42
Standard Error† 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04
Lower 95% CI† 0.28 0.15 0.33 0.28 0.10 0.32 0.28 0.15 0.34
Upper 95% CI† 0.43 0.39 0.50 0.43 0.38 0.50 0.43 0.39 0.50
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 14,370 4,502 9,868 14,161 4,424 9,737 14,151 4,415 9,736
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 2837 1556 1936 2800 1155 1912 2796 1524 2176
Right of cut-off 1237 512 874 1223 432 864 1222 504 927
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first stage. Standard errors are clustered by the
household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is used to construct the estimates in
the neighborhood of the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean squared error of the treatment effect.
The same bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include gender and race of the individual; urbanization
status of the household the individual resides in; years of education for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual
and household size.
† Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the
treatment effect.
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Table A3: The Pension Program and Labor Supply: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Hours Worked in a Week Hours Worked in a Week Hours Worked in a Week
(Primary Job) (All Jobs, Salaried Only) (Primary Job, Salaried Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Waves: 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Point Estimate† -4.84 -28.42 2.40 -5.74 -40.93 2.59 -4.24 -28.58 2.85
Standard Error† 4.09 8.89 3.62 4.15 13.45 3.89 3.99 9.13 3.54
Lower 95% CI† -12.85 -45.84 -4.70 -13.88 -67.30 -5.03 -12.06 -46.47 -4.09
Upper 95% CI† 3.16 -11.00 9.50 2.40 -14.57 10.21 3.58 -10.68 9.79
Outcome Mean 40.71 38.26 41.84 41.29 39.19 42.24 40.71 38.22 41.84
Outcome Standard
Deviation 14.73 16.51 13.69 15.75 18.55 14.20 14.65 16.46 13.59
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 14,370 4,502 9,868 14,161 4,424 9,737 14,151 4,415 9,736
Effective Observations:
Left of cut-off 2837 1556 1936 2800 1155 1912 2796 1524 2176
Right of cut-off 1237 512 874 1223 432 864 1222 504 927
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first stage. Standard errors are clustered by the
household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is used to construct the estimates in the
neighborhood of the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean squared error of the treatment effect. The same
bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include gender and race of the individual; urbanization status of the
household the individual resides in; years of education for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual and household
size.
† Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment
effect.
44
Table A4: Sensitivity of Main Estimates to Bandwidth Choice
Panel A: First Two Bandwidth chosen to minimize:
Waves (2008-2011) Mean Squared Error of Regression Discontinuity Estimate
Common, Minimum of Median of
Common Different Sum of Difference and Different, Common,
around cutoffa around cutoffb Estimatesc Sumd Common Sume
Point Estimate† -28.42 -37.08 -29.7 -29.7 -29.77
Lower 95% CI† -45.84 -60.2 -48.09 -48.09 -47.93
Upper 95% CI† -11 -13.97 -11.32 -11.32 -11.62
Standard Error† 8.886 11.79 9.381 9.381 9.264
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4502 4502 4502 4502 4502
Effective Observations:
Left of cut-off 1556 1717 1556 1556 1556
Right of cut-off 512 437 512 512 512
Outcome Mean 38.26
Outcome Standard Deviation 16.51
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Sensitivity of Main Estimates to Bandwidth Choice: Table A4 Continued
Panel B: First Two Bandwidth chosen to minimize:
Waves (2008 - 2011) Coverage Error of Confidence Intervals
Common, Minimum of Median of
Common Different Sum of Difference and Different, Common,
around cutoffa around cutoffb Estimatesc Sumd Common Sume
Point Estimate† -34.77 -44.91 -35.99 -35.99 -35.79
Lower 95% CI† -61.49 -83.5 -64.15 -64.15 -63.54
Upper 95% CI† -8.056 -6.323 -7.822 -7.822 -8.036
Standard Error† 13.63 19.69 14.37 14.37 14.16
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,502 4,502 4,502 4,502 4,502
Effective Observations:
Left of cut-off 1037 1037 901 901 1037
Right of cut-off 404 279 363 363 363
Outcome Mean 38.26
Outcome Standard Deviation 16.51
46
Sensitivity of Main Estimates to Bandwidth Choice: Table A4 Continued
Panel C: Last Three Bandwidth chosen to minimize:
Waves (2012 - 2017) Mean Squared Error of Regression Discontinuity Estimate
Common, Minimum of Median of
Common Different Sum of Difference and Different, Common,
around cutoffa around cutoffb Estimatesc Sumd Common Sume
Point Estimate† 2.399 2.08 2.401 2.399 2.399
Lower 95% CI† -4.699 -4.116 -4.613 -4.699 -4.618
Upper 95% CI† 9.498 8.276 9.415 9.498 9.416
Standard Error† 3.622 3.161 3.578 3.622 3.58
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,868 9,868 9,868 9,868 9,868
Effective Observations:
Left of cut-off 1936 2523 1936 1936 1936
Right of cut-off 874 1000 874 874 874
Outcome Mean 41.84
Outcome Standard Deviation 13.69
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Sensitivity of Main Estimates to Bandwidth Choice: Table A4 Continued
Panel D: Last Three Bandwidth chosen to minimize:
Waves (2012 - 2017) Coverage Error of Confidence Intervals
Common, Minimum of Median of
Common Different Sum of Difference and Different, Common,
around cutoffa around cutoffb Estimatesc Sumd Common Sume
Point Estimate† 3.479 2.778 3.376 3.479 3.375
Lower 95% CI† -6.638 -5.72 -6.6 -6.638 -6.602
Upper 95% CI† 13.6 11.28 13.35 13.6 13.35
Standard Error† 5.162 4.336 5.09 5.162 5.091
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,868 9,868 9,868 9,868 9,868
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 1161 1421 1161 1161 1161
Right of cut-off 620 713 620 620 620
Outcome Mean 41.84
Outcome Standard Deviation 13.69
The outcome for all estimates is weekly hours worked in the primary job. Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age
adults aged between 17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression discontinuity design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the
outcome in the first stage. Standard errors are clustered by the household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with
a triangular kernel is used to construct the estimates in the neighborhood of the cut-off. Robust point estimates, standard errors
and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment effect. Controls for all the estimates include
gender and race of the individual; years of education for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual and household size.
Notes: (a) Bandwidth constructed to be the same on either side of the cutoff (oldest household member is at least 60 years old and
thus pension eligible); (b) Bandwidth constructed to be different on either side of the cutoff; (c) Bandwidth constructed to be the
same on either side of the cutoff, but the estimator whose mean squared error (Panel A) or whose coverage error (Panel B) is being
minimized is the sum of the regression coefficients on either side of the cutoff not the difference as in (a) and (b) above; (d) The lower
bandwidth value comparing between bandwidth values calculated in (a) and (c); (e) This is the bandwidth which takes the median
value amongst the bandwidths calculated in (a), (b) and (c)
†: Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment
effect.
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Table A5: Extensive Margin Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Probability (Employed)
Sample: All Waves Wave 1 and 2 Wave 3, 4 and 5
Panel A: OLS
Pension Household -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.054*** -0.044** -0.031*** -0.026**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 48,376 47,118 17,143 16,464 31,233 30,654
R-squared 0.098 0.1 0.014 0.017 0.064 0.067
# Individuals 12,327 12,288 9,241 9,199 11,859 11,829
Panel B: IV
Pension Household -0.030** -0.025 -0.057 -0.032 -0.022 -0.022
(0.014) (0.016) (0.040) (0.048) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 47,083 45,772 15,804 14,530 29,861 29,200
# Individuals 11,034 10,942 7,902 7,265 10,487 10,375
Individual Controls † Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household Controls ‡ N Y N Y N Y
Individual Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Extensive Margin Estimates: Table A5 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Probability (Employed)
Sample: All Waves Wave 1 and 2 Wave 3, 4 and 5
First Stage Instruments
Total Pension 0.350*** 0.335*** 0.269*** 0.245*** 0.366*** 0.364***
Eligible Males (0.015) (0.016) (0.033) (0.034) (0.023) (0.023)
Total Pension 0.624*** 0.572*** 0.590*** 0.535*** 0.604*** 0.571***
Eligible Females (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.030) (0.021) (0.017)
First Stage F-Statistic 1826 1878 343 243.5 680.3 1023
Overidentification Test Statistic 3.787 0.031 0.326 0.237 2.75 0.321
p-value Overidentification 0.052 0.86 0.568 0.626 0.097 0.571
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults between the ages of 17 and 59, who are present in all five NIDS
waves and reside in non-attrition households. Standard errors clustered by grouped household identification in parentheses. As
individuals can move between households, I construct a group identification code that takes on a unique value for the string of
household identification numbers formed by combining all five wave houeshold identification numbers.
†: Individual level controls include household size; age and square of age; total household residents aged 0 to 5, 6 to 17, and 18 to
50; years of education and square of years of education; and an indicator for urbanization status.
‡: Household level controls include household head’s age and square of age; household head’s years of education; and an indicator for
whether the household head is female.
IV estimates come from a GMM model. The first stage F-Statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic, calculated to account for
clustered standard errors. Hansen’s J statistic is used to calculate the overidentification test statistic.
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Table A6: Transfers Between Households: Non-Resident Pensioners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Only Non-Resident Pension Eligible Only Non-Resident Pension Eligible Female
Outcome: Hours Worked Hours Worked Hours Worked Hours Worked
Primary Job All Jobs Primary Job All Jobs
Waves: 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Point Estimate† -8.65 0.32 -4.60 0.32 -7.85 -2.07 -25.67 -3.81
Standard Error† 2.96 1.26 3.82 1.26 5.79 3.21 8.43 3.36
Lower 95% CI† -14.46 -2.14 -12.08 -2.14 -19.20 -8.36 -42.20 -10.40
Upper 95% CI† -2.85 2.78 2.89 2.78 3.50 4.23 -9.14 2.78
Outcome Mean 38.26 41.84 39.72 42.14 37.21 40.77 39.45 40.74
Outcome Standard
Deviation 16.51 13.69 39.94 23.06 15.64 12.72 29.20 21.13
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4502 9868 6292 9868 680 1933 904 2430
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 833 2974 1221 2974 172 263 116 409
Right of cut-off 404 1477 598 1477 109 224 75 317
The outcome here is hours worked in the primary job. Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between
17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression discontinuity design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first
stage. Standard errors are clustered by the household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is
used to construct the estimates in the neighborhood of the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean squared error of
the treatment effect. The same bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include gender and race of the individual;
urbanization status of the household the individual resides in; years of education for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the
individual and household size.
† Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment
effect.
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Table A7: The Wage-Hour Function
Hour -508.6
(168.1)
Hour#Wave = 2 -243.7
(449.0)
Hour#Wave = 3 -679.2
(243.1)
Hour#Wave = 4 -1,298
(277.0)
Hour#Wave = 5 -1,436
(314.5)
Controls † Y
Observations 16,938
R-squared 0.168
Outcome Mean 3312
Outcome Standard Deviation 7330
The outcome variable is wages earned. Estimates come from a sample restricted
to working age adults between the ages of 17 and 59, who are present in all five
NIDS waves and reside in non-attrition households. Standard errors clustered by
grouped household identification in parentheses. As individuals can move between
households, I construct a group identification code that takes on a unique value for
the string of household identification numbers formed by combining all five wave
houeshold identification numbers.
†: Controls at the individual level include gender; race; household size; age and
square of age; total household residents aged 0 to 5, 6 to 17, and 18 to 50; years
of education and square of years of education; and an indicator for urbanization
status. Household level controls include household head’s age and square of age;
household head’s years of education; and an indicator for whether the household
head is female. A constant is also included.
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Table A8: Other Possible Mechanisms for the Labor Supply Effect
Panel A: Childcare Constraint -
Mothers Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Hours Worked, Primary Job Hours Worked, All Jobs
Waves: 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Point Estimate† 0.55 -799.30 10.04 19.13 -37.10 30.42
Standard Error† 9.59 447.70 6.39 22.68 34.22 21.97
Lower 95% CI† -18.24 -1677.00 -2.49 -25.32 -104.20 -12.65
Upper 95% CI† 19.35 78.26 22.57 63.58 29.97 73.48
Outcome Mean 38.07 35.89 39.13 38.28 35.97 39.57
Outcome Standard Deviation 14.83 16.89 13.60 26.94 32.57 23.13
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,630 1,828 3,802 7,514 2,685 4,829
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 1371 485 1059 1371 1005 885
Right of cut-off 769 253 568 892 455 597
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Other Possible Mechanisms for the Labor Supply Effect: Table A8 Continued
Panel B: Labor Migration -
Rural Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Hours Worked, Primary Job Hours Worked, All Jobs
Waves: 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Point Estimate† -10.00 -60.18 2.06 -10.52 -57.99 3.49
Standard Error† 9.99 23.55 6.58 9.52 32.04 11.51
Lower 95% CI† -29.58 -106.30 -10.84 -29.18 -120.80 -19.08
Upper 95% CI† 9.58 -14.01 14.96 8.15 4.81 26.06
Outcome Mean 43.58 40.66 44.96 43.56 42.36 44.17
Outcome Standard Deviation 14.91 17.38 13.37 26.78 33.27 22.71
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,659 856 1,803 3,735 1,269 2,466
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 585 323 452 1014 411 520
Right of cut-off 267 95 205 429 148 270
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first stage. Standard errors
are clustered by the household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is used to
construct the estimates in the neighborhood of the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean squared
error of the treatment effect. The same bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include gender
and race of the individual; urbanization status of the household the individual resides in; years of education for the
individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual and household size.
† Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the
treatment effect.
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Table A9: Intergenerational Transfers Within Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Overall First Two Waves Next Three Waves
Ages 17 Ages 36 Ages 17 Ages 36 Ages 17 Ages 36
to 35 to 59 to 35 to 59 to 35 to 59
Robust Point Estimate -7.13 2.14 -38.93 -28.10 0.53 8.74
Robust Standard Error 5.01 6.38 16.26 22.10 4.45 9.16
Robust Lower 95% CI -16.95 -10.36 -70.81 -71.42 -8.18 -9.21
Robust Upper 95% CI 2.68 14.63 -7.06 15.22 9.25 26.69
Outcome Mean 41.86 39.61 39.26 37.44 42.91 40.72
Outcome Standard Deviation 14.82 14.56 17.10 15.96 13.65 13.65
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,038 7,332 2,018 2,484 5,020 4,848
Effective Observations Left 988 1585 409 494 668 730
Effective Observations Right 770 416 270 121 548 225
The outcome here is hours worked in the primary job. Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between
17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression discontinuity design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first
stage. Standard errors are clustered by the household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is
used to construct the estimates in the neighborhood of the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean squared error of
the treatment effect. The same bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include gender and race of the individual;
urbanization status of the household the individual resides in; years of education for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the
individual and household size.
† Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating the treatment
effect.
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Table A10: Gendered Impacts of the Pension on Labor Supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least One Female Pensioner At least One Male Pensioner
Waves: 1 to 2 3 to 5 1 to 2 3 to 5
Point Estimate† -35.46 3.47 -112.80 -0.08
Standard Error† 12.67 5.36 67.64 8.63
Lower 95% CI† -60.30 -7.03 -245.40 -17.00
Upper 95% CI† -10.62 13.98 19.75 16.83
Outcome Mean 38.33 41.84 39.05 42.10
Outcome Standard
Deviation 16.48 13.68 29.46 22.10
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,390 9,560 5,414 10,864
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 1306 1671 1842 2832
Right of cut-off 412 637 270 548
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first stage. Standard errors
are clustered by the household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is used
to construct the estimates in the neighborhood of the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean
squared error of the treatment effect. The same bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include
gender and race of the individual; urbanization status of the household the individual resides in; years of education
for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual and household size.
† Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating
the treatment effect.
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Table A11: Individual Preferences: Reservation and Fair Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Reservation Wage Fair Wage
Sample Wave 1 to 2 Wave 3 to 5 Wave 1 to 2 Wave 3 to 5
Point Estimate† 905 -3364 77.67 295
Standard Error† 2142 2770 3999 1030
Lower 95% CI† -3294 -8793 -7760 -1724
Upper 95% CI† 5104 2064 7916 2314
Outcome Mean 3506 5252 4366 7797
Outcome Standard Deviation 10198 18379 15807 13020
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,854 12,739 5,014 28,144
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 853 2237 1175 5373
Right of cut-off 492 1071 723 3178
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59, from a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first stage. Standard errors
are clustered by the household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial with a triangular kernel is used
to construct the estimates in the neighborhood of the cut-off; the bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean
squared error of the treatment effect. The same bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include
gender and race of the individual; urbanization status of the household the individual resides in; years of education
for the individual; a quadratic in the age of the individual and household size.
†: Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias term in calculating
the treatment effect.
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Table A12: Effect of the Pension on Finding a Job
Outcome = 1 if newly employed, = 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave ≤ 2 Wave > 2 Wave > 3 Wave > 4
Household -0.022 -0.008 -0.006 0.024
Pension (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021)
First-Stage
Estimates:
Total Males 0.296 0.363 0.368 0.372
≥ 60 years (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.029)
Total Females 0.556 0.609 0.629 0.609
≥ 60 years (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021)
Controls † Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,723 7,723 17,709 17,709 12,334 12,334 6,332 6,332
F statistic ‡ 552.6 552.6 1583 1583 1320 1320 745.5 745.5
Hansen J Statistic 1.415 1.415 0.222 0.222 1.682 1.682 0.0950 0.0950
p-val 0.234 0.234 0.637 0.637 0.195 0.195 0.758 0.758
Outcome Mean 0.0365 0.0365 0.0862 0.0862 0.0967 0.0967 0.0855 0.0855
Outcome Standard
Deviation 0.188 0.188 0.281 0.281 0.296 0.296 0.280 0.280
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults between the ages of 17 and 59, who are present
in all five NIDS waves and reside in non-attrition households. Standard errors clustered by grouped household
identification in parentheses.
†: Individual level controls include household size; age and square of age; total household residents aged 0 to 5, 6
to 17, and 18 to 50; years of education and square of years of education; and an indicator for urbanization status.
Household level controls include household head’s age and square of age; household head’s years of education; and
an indicator for whether the household head is female. A constant term is also included.
‡: The first stage F-Statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic, calculated to account for clustered standard
errors. Hansen’s J statistic is used to calculate the overidentification test statistic.
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Table A13: Effect of the Pension on the Self Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Co-Resident Non-Resident
Wave ≤ 2 Wave > 2 Wave ≤ 2 Wave > 2
Point Estimate† 8.045 -0.723 31.06 11.18
Standard Error† 32.67 17.63 38.60 22.21
Lower 95% CI -55.99 -35.27 -44.59 -32.35
Upper 95% CI 72.08 33.82 106.7 54.71
Outcome Mean 40.98 41.78 40.98 41.78
Outcome Standard Deviation 67.64 41.22 67.64 41.22
Observations 1,868 2,759 1,868 2,759
Effective Observations
Left of cut-off 387 891 400 758
Right of cut-off 179 367 199 402
Estimates come from a sample restricted to working age adults aged between 17 and 59 who declare
themselves to be self-employed. For the first two columns, a fuzzy regression discontinuity design
with a household declaring a pension recipient as the outcome in the first stage is used. For the next
two columns, a sharp discontinuity design is used as the pension status of the non-resident pensioner
is not known. The outcome is hours worked in a week.
Standard errors are clustered by the household the individual resides in. A local linear polynomial
with a triangular kernel is used to construct the estimates in the neighborhood of the cut-off; the
bandwidth is selected by minimizing the mean squared error of the treatment effect. The same
bandwidth is chosen on both sides of the cut-off. Controls include gender and race of the individual;
urbanization status of the household the individual resides in; years of education for the individual;
a quadratic in the age of the individual and household size.
†: Robust point estimates, standard errors and confidence intervals incorporate an estimated bias
term in calculating the treatment effect.
